We solve an open question in code-based cryptography by introducing two provably secure group signature schemes from code-based assumptions. Our basic scheme satisfies the CPA-anonymity and traceability requirements in the random oracle model, assuming the hardness of the McEliece problem, the Learning Parity with Noise problem, and a variant of the Syndrome Decoding problem. The construction produces smaller key and signature sizes than the previous post-quantum group signature schemes from lattices, as long as the cardinality of the underlying group does not exceed 2 24 , which is roughly comparable to the current population of the Netherlands. We develop the basic scheme further to achieve the strongest anonymity notion, i.e., CCA-anonymity, with a small overhead in terms of efficiency. The feasibility of two proposed schemes is supported by implementation results. Our two schemes are the first in their respective classes of provably secure groups signature schemes. Additionally, the techniques introduced in this work might be of independent interest. These are a new verifiable encryption protocol for the randomized McEliece encryption and a novel approach to design formal security reductions from the Syndrome Decoding problem.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background and Motivation
Group signature [1] is a fundamental cryptographic primitive with two intriguing features. The first one is anonymity. It allows users of a group to anonymously sign documents on behalf of the whole group. The second one is traceability. There exists a tracing authority that can tie a given signature to the signer's identity should the need arise. These two properties make group signatures highly useful in various real-life scenarios such as controlled anonymous printing services, digital right management systems, e-bidding and e-voting schemes. Theoretically, designing secure and efficient group signature schemes is of deep interest since doing so typically requires a sophisticated combination of carefully chosen cryptographic ingredients. Numerous constructions of group signatures have been proposed. Most of them, e.g., the respective schemes in [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , and [6] , are based on classical number-theoretic assumptions.
While number-theoretic-based group signatures, such as those in [3] and [4] , can be very efficient, they would become insecure once the era of scalable quantum computing arrives [7] . Prior to our work, the search for post-quantum group signatures, as a preparation for the future, has been quite active, with at least six published schemes [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] . All of them are based on computational assumptions from lattices. Despite their theoretical interest, the schemes require significantly large key and signature sizes. None of them has been supported by implementation results. Our evaluation, in Section I-B below, shows that these lattice-based schemes are indeed very far from being practical. This somewhat unsatisfactory situation highlights two interesting challenges. The first one is to push post-quantum group signatures closer to practice. The second one is to bring more diversity in, with schemes from other candidates for post-quantum cryptography, e.g., code-based, hash-based, and multivariate-based. An easy-to-implement and competitively efficient code-based group signature scheme, for instance, would be highly desirable.
A code-based group signature, in the strongest security model for static groups as discussed in [14] , typically requires the following three cryptographic layers.
1) The first layer requires a secure (standard) signature scheme to sign messages. Note that in most schemes based on the model in [14] , a standard signature is also employed to issue the users' secret keys. However, this is not necessary. The and a uniformly random syndromeỹ ∈ F r 2 , the problem asks to find a vector s ∈ F m 2 of Hamming weight ω, denoted by s ∈ B(m, ω), such that H · s ⊤ =ỹ ⊤ . In our scheme, the key generation algorithm produces a public key that contains a matrix H ∈ F r×m 2 and syndromes y j ∈ F r 2 , while users are given secret keys of the form s j ∈ B(m, ω) such that H · s ⊤ j = y ⊤ j . In the security proof, since we would like to embed an SD challenge instance ( H,ỹ) into the public key without being noticed, except with negligible probability, by the adversary, we have to require that H and the y j 's produced by the key generation are indistinguishable from uniform. One method to generate these keys is to employ the "hash-and-sign" technique from the CFS signature [15] . Unfortunately, while the syndromes y j 's could be made uniformly random, as the outputs of the random oracle, the assumption that the CFS matrix H is computationally close to uniform for practical parameters is invalidated by the distinguishing attacks from [19] . Another method, pioneered by Stern [20] , is to pick H and the s j 's uniformly at random. The corresponding syndromes y j 's could be made computationally close to uniform if the parameters are set such that ω is slightly smaller than the value ω 0 given by the Gilbert-Varshamov bound, i.e., ω 0 such that m ω0 ≈ 2 r . In such a case, the function f H (s j ) = H·s ⊤ j acts as a pseudorandom generator [39] . However, for these parameters, it is not guaranteed with high probability that a uniformly random SD instance ( H,ỹ) has solutions, which would affect the success probability of the reduction algorithm. Our work considers the case when ω is moderately larger than ω 0 , so that two conditions hold. First, the uniform distribution over the set B(m, ω) has sufficient min-entropy to apply the Left-over Hash Lemma from [40] . Second, the SD problem with parameters (m, r, ω) admits solutions with high probability, yet remains intractable against the best known attacks from [42] and [43] . Note that the variant of the SD problem considered in this work are not widely believed to be the hardest one [20] , [41] , but suitable parameters can be chosen such that the best known attacks run in exponential time.
Further treatment on how to decide on the parameters will be given in Section VI. This approach gives us a new method to generate uniformly random vectors s j ∈ B(m, ω) and a matrix H ∈ F r×m 2 so that the syndromes y j 's corresponding to the s j 's are statistically close to uniform. The approach, which somewhat resembles the technique used in [44] for the Inhomogeneous Small Integer Solution problem, is helpful in our security proof and, generally, in designing formal security reductions from the SD problem.
Contributions to Post-Quantum Group Signatures. Our constructions provide the first non-lattice-based alternatives to provably secure post-quantum group signatures. Our schemes feature public key and signature sizes linear in the number of group users N , which are asymptotically not as efficient as the previously published lattice-based counterparts [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] . However, when instantiated with practical parameters, our schemes behave much more efficiently than the scheme proposed in [13] . The latter is arguably the current most efficient lattice-based group signature in the asymptotic sense. Indeed, our estimation shows that our basic scheme, which achieves the CPA-anonymity notion, gives public key and signature sizes that are 2, 300 times and 540 times smaller, respectively, for an average-size group of N = 2 8 users. As N grows, the advantage lessens, but our basic scheme remains more efficient even for a huge group of N = 2 24 users, a number which is roughly comparable to the current population of the Netherlands. Our extended scheme, which achieves the strongest anonymity notion, i.e., CCA-anonymity, introduces only a small overhead of about 434 KB and 177 KB in public key and signature sizes, respectively, compared to the basic scheme. Table I gives the details of our estimation. The parameters for our schemes are set as in Section VI. For the scheme in [13] , we choose the commonly used lattice dimension n = 2 8 and set the parameters m = 2 9 × 150 and q = 2 150 to satisfy the requirements given in [13, Section 5.1]. While our basic scheme and the scheme in [13] achieve the CPA-anonymity notion [4] , our extended scheme achieves the CCA-anonymity notion [14] . All schemes have soundness error 2 −80 . We give actual implementation results for our proposed schemes to support their claim of feasibility. In our implementations, as presented later in Section VI, the actual signature sizes can be reduced thanks to an additional technique. Our schemes are the first post-quantum group signature that comes supported with an actual deployment analysis. The results, while not yielding a truly practical scheme, certainly help in bringing post-quantum group signatures closer to practice. 
C. Overview of Our Techniques
Let m, r, ω, n, k, t and ℓ be positive integers. We consider a group of size N = 2 ℓ , where each user is indexed by an integer j ∈ [0, N − 1]. The secret signing key of user j is a vector s j chosen uniformly at random from the set B(m, ω). A uniformly random matrix H ∈ F r×m 2 and N syndromes y 0 , . . . , y N −1 ∈ F r 2 , such that H · s ⊤ j = y ⊤ j , for all j, are made public. Let us now explain the development of the three ingredients used in our basic scheme. The Signature Layer. User j can run Stern's ZK protocol [20] to prove the possession of a vector s ∈ B(m, ω) such that
The constraint s ∈ B(m, ω) is proved in ZK by randomly permuting the entries of s and showing that the permuted vector belongs to B(m, ω). The protocol is then transformed into a Fiat-Shamir signature [24] . However, such a signature is publicly verifiable only if the index j is given to the verifier.
The user can further hide its index j to achieve unconditional anonymity among all N users. This, incidentally, yields a ring signature [45] on the way,à la [46] .
. Let x = δ N j be the N -dimensional unit vector with entry 1 at the j-th position and 0 elsewhere. Observe that A · x ⊤ = y ⊤ j , and thus, the equation
where ⊕ denotes addition modulo 2. Stern's framework allows the user to prove in ZK the possession of (s, x) satisfying this equation, where the condition x = δ N j can be justified using a random permutation. The Encryption Layer. To enable the tracing capability of the scheme, we let user j encrypt the binary representation of j via the randomized McEliece encryption scheme [27] . Specifically, we represent j as I2B(j) = (j 0 , . . . , j ℓ−1 ) ∈ {0, 1} ℓ , where
, a ciphertext of I2B(j) is of the form
where (u, e) is the encryption randomness, with u ∈ F k−ℓ 2 , and e ∈ B(n, t), i.e., e is a vector of weight t in F n 2 . Connecting the Signature and Encryption Layers. User j must demonstrate that it does not cheat, e.g., by encrypting some string that does not point to j, without revealing j. Thus, we need a ZK protocol that allows the user to prove that the vector x = δ N j used in (1) and the plaintext hidden in (2) both correspond to the same secret j ∈ [0, N − 1]. The crucial challenge is to establish a connection, which must be verifiable in ZK, between the "index representation" δ N j and the binary representation I2B(j). We show how to handle this challenge well.
Instead of working with I2B(j) = (j 0 , . . . , j ℓ−1 ), let us consider an extension of I2B(j), defined as
We then suitably insert ℓ zero-rows into G to obtain G ∈ F
Now, let B2I :
be the inverse function of I2B(·). For every b ∈ {0, 1} ℓ , we carefully design two classes of permutations
Given the equivalences, the protocol's user samples a uniformly random vector b ∈ {0, 1} ℓ and sends
, should be convinced that x and f correspond to the same j ∈ [0, N − 1], yet the value of j is completely hidden from its view since b acts essentially as a one-time pad.
The technique extending I2B(j) into Encode(j) and then permuting Encode(j) in a "one-time pad" fashion is inspired by a method originally proposed by Langlois et al. in [11] in a seemingly unrelated context. There, the goal is to prove that the message being signed under the Bonsai tree signature [47] is of the form I2B(j), for some j ∈ [0, N − 1]. Here, we adapt and develop their method to simultaneously prove two facts. First, the plaintext being encrypted under the randomized McEliece encryption is of the form I2B(j). Second, the unit vector x = δ N j is used in the signature layer. By embedding the above technique into Stern's framework, we obtain an interactive ZK argument system, in which, given the public input (H, A, G), the user is able to prove the possession of a secret tuple (j, s, x, u, f , e) satisfying (1) and (3). The protocol is repeated many times to achieve negligible soundness error, and then made non-interactive, resulting in a noninteractive ZK argument of knowledge Π. The final group signature is of the form (c, Π), where c is the ciphertext. In the random oracle model, the anonymity of the scheme relies on the zero-knowledge property of Π and the CPA-security of the randomized McEliece encryption scheme, while its traceability is based on the hardness of the variant of the SD problem discussed earlier.
Achieving CCA-Anonymity. Our basic group signature scheme makes use of the randomized McEliece encryption scheme that achieves only CPA-security. Hence, it only satisfies CPA-anonymity for which the adversary is not granted access to the signature opening oracle. To achieve the strongest notion of anonymity put forward in [14] , i.e., CCA-anonymity, we would need a CCA2-secure encryption scheme so that we can respond to adaptive opening queries from the adversary by invoking the decryption oracle associated with the encryption mechanism. There are a number of known CCA2-secure code-based encryption schemes, e.g., [28] , [29] , [30] . They are, however, either too inefficient, say with ciphertext size quadratic in the security parameter, or incompatible with zero-knowledge protocols for proving the well-formedness of ciphertexts. Hence, they are unsuitable for our purpose. Instead, we exploit the fact that our verifiable encryption protocol for the randomized McEliece scheme is a simulation-sound ZK argument of knowledge. We then upgrade the encryption system further to a CCA2-secure one via the Naor-Yung twin-encryption paradigm [51] . The protocol operates in Stern's framework and satisfies the "quasiunique responses" property in [48] , deriving simulation-soundness from soundness. This fact was recently exploited by several group signature schemes, such as [49] and [50] , which are based on Stern-like protocols.
Specifically, we will work with two public keys G (1) and G (2) of the randomized McEliece encryption scheme. The user now encrypts I2B(j) under each of the keys to obtain ciphertexts c (1) and c (2) , respectively, and extend the verifiable encryption protocol discussed above to prove that these ciphertexts are well-formed and correspond to the same plaintext I2B(j), which is the binary representation of the user's index j. This extension is quite smooth, since the same techniques for handling ciphertext c can be used to handle c (1) and c (2) . In the proof of CCA-anonymity, we then employ the strategy of [52] that makes use of the CPA-security of the underlying encryption scheme and the zero-knowledge, soundness and simulation-soundness of the resulting non-interactive argument. In terms of efficiency, our CCA-anonymous construction only has a small and reasonable overhead compared to its CPA-anonymous version, with one more McEliece encrypting matrix in the group public key and one more ciphertext equipped with its supporting ZK sub-protocol in the group signature.
D. Related Works
The present paper is the full extension of our earlier work [53] , which was published in the proceedings of ASIACRYPT 2015. Achieving CCA-anonymity for code-based group signatures was raised as an open question in [53] . We are able to fully address the problem in this work.
In a work concurrent to and independent of [53] , Alamélou et al. also proposed a code-based group signature scheme in [54] and, later on, in [55] . Their scheme considers the setting of dynamic groups. It does not use any encryption mechanism to enable traceability. Instead, the authors rely on a modified version of Stern's protocol that allows the opening authority to test whether each protocol execution is generated using a secret key of a given user. Unfortunately, such approach does not yield a secure group signature. Recall that Stern's protocol admits a soundness error of 2/3 in each execution. It has to be repeated κ = ω(log λ) times, where λ is the security parameter, to make the error negligibly small. Then, a valid signature is generated by an honest user j if and only if the tests for all κ executions of the protocol yield the same user j. Unfortunately, the testing mechanism used in their scheme fails to capture this crucial point. When running through protocol execution numbers 1, 2, . . . , κ, it stops and outputs user j when it sees the first execution that points to j. This shortcoming opens a room for cheating users to break the traceability and non-frameability of the scheme. Specifically, a cheating user j ′ , who wants to mislead the opening result to an innocent user j, can simulate the first several protocol executions. The simulation can be done with noticeable probability using the transcript simulator associated with the protocol, because each execution admits a soundness error of 2/3. If the opening algorithm is run, it would return j with noticeable probability. The remaining protocol executions are done faithfully with secret key for user j ′ . Thus, the construction in [54] and [55] is not secure. We note that a very similar testing mechanism for Stern-like protocols was used in [11] to avoid the use of encryption in their group signature. This had been broken. In [56] , which is the corrected version of [11] , the authors eventually had to rely on an encryption-like mechanism to enable traceability.
In a very recent work, Nguyen et al. [57] proposed a number of new code-based privacy-preserving cryptographic constructions, including the first code-based group signature scheme with logarithmic signature size which resolves an interesting question we left open in [53] . In their scheme, group users are associated with leaves in a code-based Merkle tree supported by a zero-knowledge argument of tree inclusion, which has communication cost linear in the tree depth (and hence, logarithmic in the number of users). Although their scheme achieves better asymptotic efficiency than ours, it yields signature size larger than 2.5 MB even for small groups. In particular, for groups of size up to 2 16 , the signatures are longer than those produced by our CPA-anonymous and CCA-anonymous schemes.
Subsequent to the publication of [53] , a number of lattice-based group signatures have been proposed, bringing post-quantum group signatures much closer to practice. Examples include the works done in [49] , [58] , [50] , [59] , and [60] . We believe that this interesting research direction will continue to attract attention from the community. The hope is that some provably secure and truly practical schemes can be realized in the near future.
II. PRELIMINARIES
NOTATIONS. Let λ be the security parameter and negl(λ) denote a negligible function in λ. We use a $ ← A if a is chosen uniformly at random from the finite set A. The symmetric group of all permutations of k elements is denoted by S k . Bold capital letters, e.g., A, denote matrices. Bold lowercase letters, e.g., x, denote row vectors. We use x ⊤ to denote the transpose of x and wt(x) to denote the (Hamming) weight of x. We denote by B(m, ω) the set of all vectors x ∈ F m 2 such that wt(x) = ω. Throughout the paper, we define a function I2B which takes a non-negative integer a as an input, and outputs the binary representation (a 0 , · · · , a ℓ−1 ) ∈ {0, 1} ℓ of a such that a = ℓ−1 i=0 a i 2 ℓ−1−i , and a function B2I which takes as an input the binary representation (a 0 , · · · , a ℓ−1 ) ∈ {0, 1} ℓ of a, and outputs a. All logarithms are in base 2.
A. Background on Code-Based Cryptography
We first recall the Syndrome Decoding problem. It is well-known to be NP-complete [61] , and is widely believed to be intractable in the average case for appropriate choice of parameters [20] , [41] .
Definition 1 (The Syndrome Decoding problem): The SD(m, r, ω) problem asks, given a uniformly random matrix H ∈ F r×m 2 and a uniformly random syndrome y ∈ F r 2 , for a vector
and ω = ω(λ), we say that the SD(m, r, ω) problem is hard if the success probability of any PPT algorithm in solving the problem is at most negl(λ).
In our security reduction, the following variant of the Left-over Hash Lemma for matrix multiplication over F 2 is used. Lemma 1 (Left-over Hash Lemma, adapted from [40] ): Let D be a distribution over F The Randomized McEliece Encryption Scheme. We employ the following randomized variant, suggested in [27] , of the McEliece encryption scheme [25] , where a uniformly random vector is concatenated to the plaintext. 1) ME.Setup(1 λ ): Select the parameters n = n(λ), k = k(λ), t = t(λ) for a binary [n, k, 2t+1] Goppa code. Choose integers
2) ME.KeyGen(n, k, t): Perform the following steps. a) Produce a generator matrix
and a random permutation matrix
. b) Output encrypting key pk ME = G and decrypting key sk ME = (S, G ′ , P).
3) ME.Enc(pk ME , m):
where Decode is an error-correcting algorithm with respect to
2 and m ∈ F k2 2 , and return m. The scheme described above is CPA-secure in the standard model, assuming the hardness of the DMcE(n, k, t) problem and the DLPN(k 1 , n, B(n, t)) problem [27] , [62] . We now recall these two problems.
Definition 2 (The Decisional McEliece problem):
is a uniformly random matrix over F k×n 2 or is generated by ME.KeyGen(n, k, t) above. When n = n(λ), k = k(λ), t = t(λ), we say that the DMcE(n, k, t) problem is hard if the success probability of any PPT distinguisher is at most 1/2 + negl(λ).
Definition 3 (The Decisional Learning Parity with (fixed-weight) Noise problem):
← B(n, t) and outputting (A, u · A ⊕ e). When k = k(λ), n = n(λ), t = t(λ), we say that the DLPN(k, n, B(n, t)) problem is hard, if the success probability of any PPT distinguisher is at most 1/2 + negl(λ).
B. Group Signatures
We follow the definition of group signatures provided in [14] for the case of static groups.
is a tuple of the following four polynomial-time algorithms. 1) KeyGen: This randomized algorithm takes as input (1 λ , 1 N ), where N ∈ N is the number of group users, and outputs (gpk, gmsk, gsk), where gpk is the group public key, gmsk is the group manager's secret key, and gsk = {gsk and returns a group signature Σ on M . 3) Verify: This deterministic algorithm takes as input the group public key gpk, a message M , a signature Σ on M . The output is either 1 (Accept) or 0 (Reject). 4) Open: This deterministic algorithm takes as input the group manager's secret key gmsk, a message M , a signature Σ on M . It outputs either an index j ∈ [0, N − 1], which is associated with a particular user, or ⊥, indicating failure.
A correct group signature scheme requires that, for all λ, N ∈ N, all (gpk, gmsk, gsk) produced by KeyGen(
, and all messages M ∈ {0, 1} * , we have
A secure group signature scheme must meet two security conditions. 1) Traceability: all signatures, even those produced by a coalition of group users and the group manager, can be traced back to a member of the coalition.
2) Anonymity: signatures generated by two distinct group users are computationally indistinguishable to an adversary who knows all of the user secret keys. In Bellare et al.'s model [14] , the anonymity adversary is granted access to an opening oracle (CCA-anonymity). A relaxed notion, where the adversary cannot query the opening oracle (CPA-anonymity), was later proposed by Boneh et al. [4] . We now give the formal definitions of CPA-anonymity, CCA-anonymity and traceability. Definition 5: A group signature GS = (KeyGen, Sign, Verify, Open) is CPA-anonymous if, for all polynomial N (·) and any PPT adversaries A, the advantage of A in the following experiment is negligible in λ.
A group signature GS = (KeyGen, Sign, Verify, Open) is CCA-anonymous if for all polynomial N (·) and any PPT adversaries A, the advantage of A in the following experiment is negligible in λ.
1) Run (gpk, gmsk, gsk) ← KeyGen(1 λ , 1 N ) and send (gpk, gsk) to A. 2) A can make queries to the opening oracle. On input a message M and a signature Σ, the oracle returns Open(gmsk, M, Σ) to A.
A can make further queries to the opening oracle, with the exception that it cannot query for the opening of (M * , Σ * ).
A group signature GS = (KeyGen, Sign, Verify, Open) is traceable if for all polynomial N (·) and any PPT adversaries A, the success probability of A in the following experiment is negligible in λ.
1) Run (gpk, gmsk, gsk) ← KeyGen(1 λ , 1 N ) and send (gpk, gmsk) to A. 2) A may query the following oracles adaptively and in any order.
Let CU be the set of identities queried to O Corrupt . 3) Finally, A outputs a message M * and a signature Σ * .
III. THE UNDERLYING ZERO-KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT SYSTEM
A statistical zero-knowledge argument system is an interactive protocol where the soundness property holds for computationally bounded cheating provers, while the zero-knowledge property holds against any cheating verifier. In this section we present a statistical zero-knowledge argument system which will serve as a building block in our group signature scheme in Section IV.
Before describing the protocol, we introduce several supporting notations and techniques. Let ℓ be a positive integer and
ℓ , we define two pertmutations. The first permutation
Observe that, for any j ∈ [0, N − 1] and any b ∈ {0, 1} ℓ , we have 
A. The Interactive Protocol
We now present our interactive zero-knowledge argument of knowledge (ZKAoK). Let n, k, t, m, r, ω, ℓ be positive integers, and N = 2 ℓ . The public input consists of matrices
, the N syndromes y 0 , . . . , y N −1 ∈ F r 2 , and vectors c 1 , c 2 ∈ F n 2 . The protocol allows the prover P to simultaneously convince the verifier V in zero-knowledge that P possesses a vector s ∈ B(m, ω) corresponding to certain syndrome y j ∈ {y 0 , . . . , y N −1 } with hidden index j, and that c 1 and c 2 are correct encryptions of I2B(j) via two instances of the randomized McEliece encryption. Specifically, the secret witness of P is a tuple (j, s,
by replacing its last ℓ rows g k−ℓ+1 , g k−ℓ+2 , . . . , g k by the 2ℓ rows
, we can equivalently rewrite (6) as
To obtain a ZKAoK for relation (7) in Stern's framework [20] , P proceeds as follows.
To prove that x = δ N j and f = Encode(j) while keeping j secret, P samples a uniformly random vector b ∈ {0, 1} ℓ , sends
. By the equivalences observed in (4) and (5), the verifier will be convinced about the facts to prove. Furthermore, since b essentially acts as a one-time pad, the secret j remains perfectly hidden.
To prove in zero-knowledge that s ∈ B(m, ω), P samples a uniformly random permutation π ∈ S m , and shows that π(s) ∈ B(m, ω). Similarly, to prove in zero-knowledge that e ∈ B(n, t), a uniformly random permutation σ ∈ S n is employed.
Finally, to prove the linear equations in zero-knowledge, P samples uniformly random "masking" vectors (r s , r x , r u , r f , r e ) and shows that
Now let COM : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} λ be a collision-resistant hash function, to be modelled as a random oracle. The prover P and the verifier V first perform the preparatory steps described above, and then interact as described in Figure 1 .
B. Analysis of the Protocol
The following theorem summarizes the properties of our protocol. Theorem 2: The interactive protocol described in Section III-A has perfect completeness. Its communication cost is bounded above by β = (N + 3 log N ) + m(log m + 1) + n(log n + 1) + k + 5λ bits. If COM is modelled as a random oracle, then the protocol is statistical zero-knowledge. If COM is a collision-resistant hash function, then the protocol is an argument of knowledge.
The given interactive protocol is perfectly complete, i.e., if P possesses a valid witness (j, s, u, e) and follows the protocol, then V always outputs 1. Indeed, given (j, s, u, e) satisfying (6), P can always obtain (j, s, x, u, f , e) satisfying (7). Then, as discussed above, the following three assertions hold.
Thus, P always passes V's checks whenever Ch = 1. When Ch = 2, P also passes the verification since the linear equations in (8) hold true. Finally, for Ch = 3, it suffices to note that V simply checks for honest computations of c 1 and c 2 .
Let us now consider the communication cost. The commitment CMT has bit-size 3λ. If Ch = 1, then the response RSP has bit-size 3ℓ + N + 2(m+ n+ λ). If Ch = 2 or Ch = 3, then RSP has bit-size 2ℓ + N + m(log m+ 1)+ n(log n+ 1)+ k + 2λ. Therefore, the protocol's total communication cost, in bits, is less than the specified bound β.
The following lemma says that our interactive protocol is statistically zero-knowledge if COM is modelled as a random oracle. We will supply a proof of Lemma 3 later in Appendix A-A. It employs the standard simulation technique for Stern-type protocols as was done, e.g., in [20] , [63] , and [64] . 1) Commitment: P samples the uniformly random objects
It then sends the commitment CMT := (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) to V, where
2) Challenge: Upon receiving CMT, V sends a challenge Ch $ ← {1, 2, 3} to P. 3) Response: P responds based on Ch.
a) If Ch = 1: Reveal c 2 and c 3 . Let
Send RSP := b 3 , π 3 , σ 3 , y s , y x , y u , y f , y e ; ρ 1 , ρ 2 to V. 4) Verification: Upon receiving RSP, V proceeds based on Ch.
a) If Ch = 1:
2 . Check that w s ∈ B(m, ω), w e ∈ B(n, t),
In each case, V outputs 1 if and only if all of the conditions hold. Otherwise, V outputs 0. 
Lemma 3:
In the random oracle model, there exists an efficient simulator S interacting with a (possibly cheating) verifier V, such that, given only the public input of the protocol, S outputs, with probability negligibly close to 2/3, a simulated transcript that is statistically close to the one produced by the honest prover in the real interaction.
The next lemma, whose proof will be provided in Appendix A-B, establishes that our protocol satisfies the special soundness property of Σ-protocols. This implies, as had been shown in [65] , that the protocol is indeed an argument of knowledge.
Lemma 4: Let COM be a collision-resistant hash function. Given the public input of the protocol, a commitment CMT and three valid responses RSP 1 , RSP 2 , RSP 3 to all three possible values of the challenge Ch, one can efficiently construct a knowledge extractor E that outputs a tuple (j
, and e ′ ∈ B(n, t).
IV. A CPA-ANONYMOUS CODE-BASED GROUP SIGNATURE
This section discusses our basic scheme that achieves CPA-anonimity. We start with a description of the scheme and end with the evaluation of its properties.
A. Description, Efficiency, and Correctness of the Scheme
Our group signature scheme consists of the following four algorithms. 1) KeyGen(1 λ , 1 N ): On input a security parameter λ and an expected number of group users N = 2 ℓ ∈ poly(λ), for some positive integer ℓ, this algorithm first selects the following parameters and hash functions. a) Parameters n = n(λ), k = k(λ), t = t(λ) for a binary [n, k, 2t + 1] Goppa code. b) Parameters m = m(λ), r = r(λ), ω = ω(λ) for the Syndrome Decoding problem, such that
c) Two collision-resistant hash functions, to be modelled as random oracles: i) COM : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} λ to generate zero-knowledge arguments. ii) H : {0, 1} * → {1, 2, 3} κ , where κ = ω · log λ, for the Fiat-Shamir transformation.
The algorithm then performs the following steps. a) Run ME.KeyGen(n, k, t) to obtain a key pair pk ME = G ∈ F This is done by employing the interactive argument system in Section III with public input (G, H, y 0 , . . . , y N −1 , c), and prover's witness (j, s, u, e) that satisfies
The protocol is repeated κ = ω · log λ times to achieve negligible soundness error, before being made non-interactive by using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. We have
where Ch (1) , . . . ,
, . . . , CMT (κ) ; gpk, c ∈ {1, 2, 3} κ .
c) Output the group signature Σ = (c, Π).
3) Verify(gpk, M, Σ): Parse Σ as (c, Π), parse Π as in (12) , and then proceed as follows. The efficiency, correctness, and security aspects of the above group signature scheme can now be summarized into the following theorem.
Theorem 5: The given group signature scheme is correct. The public key has size nk + (m + N )r bits. The bit-size of the signatures is bounded above by (N + 3 log N ) + m(log m + 1) + n(log n + 1) + k + 5λ κ + n. In the random oracle model we can make two further assertions. First, if the Decisional McEliece problem DMcE(n, k, t) and the Decisional Learning Parity with fixed-weight Noise problem DLPN(k − ℓ, n, B(n, t)) are hard, then the scheme is CPA-anonymous. Second, if the Syndrome Decoding problem SD(m, r, ω) is hard, then the scheme is traceable.
In terms of efficiency, it is clear from (10) that gpk has bit-size nk + (m + N )r. The length of the NIZKAoK Π is κ times the communication cost of the underlying interactive protocol. Thus, by Theorem 2, Σ = (c, Π) has bit-size bounded above by (N + 3 log N ) + m(log m + 1) + n(log n + 1) + k + 5λ κ + n.
To see that the given group signature scheme is correct, first observe that the honest user with index j, for any j ∈ [0, N − 1], can always obtain a tuple (j, s, u, e) satisfying (11) . Then, since the underlying interactive protocol is perfectly complete, Π is a valid NIZKAoK and algorithm Verify(gpk, M, Σ) always outputs 1, for any message M ∈ {0, 1} * . On the correctness of Open, it suffices to note that, if the ciphertext c is of the form c = u I2B(j) · G ⊕ e, where e ∈ B(n, t), then, by the correctness of the randomized McEliece encryption scheme, ME.Dec(gmsk, c) outputs I2B(j).
B. Anonymity
Let A be any PPT adversary attacking the CPA-anonymity of the scheme with advantage ǫ. We will prove that ǫ = negl(λ) based on the ZK property of the underlying argument system. To do so, we retain the assumed hardness of the DMcE(n, k, t) and the DLPN(k − ℓ, n, B(n, t)) problems. Specifically, we consider the following sequence of hybrid experiments G Since the underlying argument system is statistically zero-knowledge, Π * is statistically close to the real NIZKAoK. As a result, the simulated signature Σ * = c * , Π * is statistically close to the one in experiment G . Lemma 6 will demonstrate that Experiments G 2 with probability non-negligibly larger than 1/2, then there exists an efficient distinguisher D 1 that solves the DMcE(n, k, t) problem with the same probability.
Proof: An instance of the DMcE(n, k, t) problem is G * ∈ F k×n 2 , which can either be uniformly random or be generated by ME.KeyGen(n, k, t). The distinguisher D 1 receives a challenge instance G * and uses A to distinguish between the two. It interacts with A by performing the following steps. We observe that if G * is generated by ME.KeyGen(n, k, t) then the view of A in the interaction with D 1 is statistically close to its view in Experiment G 2 with probability non-negligibly larger than 1/2, then D 1 can use A's guess to solve the challenge instance G * of the DMcE(n, k, t) problem, with the same probability.
, and G 2 ∈ F are computationally indistinguishable based on the assumed hardness of the DLPN(k − ℓ, n, B(n, t)) problem, as shown in Lemma 7.
3 with probability non-negligibly larger than 1/2, then there exists an efficient distinguisher D 2 solving the DLPN(k − ℓ, n, B(n, t)) problem with the same probability.
Proof: An instance of the DLPN(k − ℓ, n, B(n, t)) problem is a pair (B, v) ∈ F 3 with probability non-negligibly larger than 1/2, then D 2 can use A's guess to solve the challenge instance of the DLPN(k − ℓ, B(n, t)) problem with the same probability. 3 are statistically indistinguishable. We note that G 4 no longer depends on the challenger's bit b, and thus, A's advantage in this experiment is 0.
Experiment
The above discussion shows that Experiments G
3 , G 4 are indistinguishable and that Adv A (G 4 ) = 0. It then follows that the advantage of A in attacking the CPA-anonymity of the scheme, i.e., in experiment G
0 , is negligible. The CPA-anonymity property is, thus, confirmed.
C. Traceability
Let A be a PPT traceability adversary against our group signature scheme with success probability ǫ. We construct a PPT algorithm F that solves the SD(m, r, ω) problem with success probability polynomially related to ǫ.
Algorithm F receives a challenge SD(m, r, ω) instance, i.e., a uniformly random matrix-syndrome pair ( H,ỹ) ∈ F 3) Run ME.KeyGen(n, k, t) to obtain a key pair pk ME = G ∈ F k×n 2 ; sk ME . 4) Send gpk = G, H, y 0 , . . . , y N −1 and gmsk = sk ME to A. Since the parameters m, r, ω were chosen such that r ≤ log m w − 2λ − O(1), Lemma 1 says that the distribution of the syndrome y j , for all j = j * , is statistically close to the uniform distribution over F r 2 . In addition, the syndrome y j * =ỹ is truly uniform over F r 2 . It then follows that the distribution of (y 0 , . . . , y N −1 ) is statistically close to that of the real scheme as noted in Remark 1. As a result, the distribution of (gpk, gmsk) is statistically close to the distribution expected by A.
The forger F then initializes a set CU = ∅ and handles the queries from A according to the following procedure. 1) Queries to the random oracle H are handled by consistently returning uniformly random values in {1, 2, 3} κ . Suppose that A makes Q H queries, then for each η ≤ Q H , we let r η denote the answer to the η-th query.
2) O
Corrupt (j), for any j ∈ [0, N − 1], depends on how j and j * are related. If j = j * , then F sets CU := CU ∪ {j} and gives s j to A. If j = j * , then F aborts.
3) O
Sign (j, M ), for any j ∈ [0, N − 1] and any message M , also depends on j and j * . If j = j * , then F honestly computes a signature, since it has the secret key s j . If j = j * , then F returns a simulated signature Σ * computed as in Section IV-B.
Please consult, specifically, Experiment G
1 in the proof of anonymity. At some point, A outputs a forged group signature Σ * on some message M * , where
By the requirements of the traceability experiment, one has Verify(gpk, M * , Σ * ) = 1 and, for all j ∈ CU , signatures of user j on M * were never queried. Now F uses sk ME to open Σ * , and aborts if the opening algorithm does not output j * . It can be checked that F aborts with probability at most (N − 1)/N + (2/3) κ . This is because the choice of j * ∈ [0, N − 1] is completely hidden from A's view and A can only violate the soundness of the argument system with probability at most (2/3) κ . Thus, with probability at least 1/N − (2/3) κ ,
Suppose that (13) holds. Algorithm F then exploits the forgery as follows. Denote by ∆ the tuple
Observe that if A has never queried the random oracle H on input ∆, then Pr Ch (1) , . . . , Ch (κ) = H(∆) ≤ 3 −κ . Thus, with probability at least ǫ − 3 −κ , there exists certain η * ≤ Q H such that ∆ was the input of the η * -th query. Next, F picks η * as the target forking point and replays A many times with the same random tape and input as in the original run. In each rerun, for the first η * − 1 queries, A is given the same answers r 1 , . . . , r Lemma 7] implies that, with probability larger than 1/2 and within less than 32 · Q H /(ǫ − 3 −κ ) executions of A, algorithm F can obtain a 3-fork involving the tuple ∆. Now, let the answers of F with respect to the 3-fork branches be r 1,η * = (Ch 3 ). Then, by a simple calculation, one has Pr ∃i ∈ {1, . . . , κ} : {Ch
Conditioned on the existence of such index i, one parses the three forgeries corresponding to the fork branches to obtain RSP
3 . They turn out to be three valid responses with respect to 3 different challenges for the same commitment CMT (i) . Then, by using the knowledge extractor of the underlying interactive argument system (see Lemma 4), one can efficiently extract a tuple (j
Since the given group signature scheme is correct, the equation
On the other hand, we have Open(sk ME , M * , Σ * ) = j * , which leads to j ′ = j * . Therefore, it holds that
. In other words, s ′ is a valid solution to the challenge SD(m, r, ω) instance ( H,ỹ). Finally, the above analysis shows that, if A has success probability ǫ and running time T in attacking the traceability of our group signature scheme, then F has success probability at least 1/2 1/N − (2/3) κ 1 − (7/9) κ and running time at most 32 · T · Q H /(ǫ − 3 −κ ) + poly(λ, N ). This concludes the proof of the traceability property.
V. ACHIEVING CCA-ANONYMITY
In this section, we propose and analyse a code-based group signature that achieves the strong notion of CCA-anonymity. The scheme is an extension of the CPA-anonymous scheme described in Section IV-A. To achieve CCA-security for the underlying encryption layer via the Naor-Yung transformation [51] , the binary representation of the signer's index j is now verifiably encrypted twice under two different randomized McEliece public keys pk ME (1) and pk ME (2) . This enables CCA-anonymity for the resulting group signature scheme. In describing the scheme, the focus is on presenting the modifications that we must make with respect to the earlier scheme from Section IV-A.
A. Description of the Scheme
We start with the four algorithms that constitute the scheme.
The algorithm proceeds as the key generation algorithm of Section IV-A, with the following alteration. ME.KeyGen(n, k, t) is run twice, producing two key pairs (pk ME (1) = G (1) , sk ME (1) ) and (pk ME (2) = G (2) , sk ME (2) ) for the randomized McEliece encryption. Then G (1) and G (2) are included in the group public key gpk, the opening secret key gmsk is defined to be sk ME (1) , while sk ME (2) is discarded.
2) Sign(gsk[j], M ): The binary representation I2B(j) ∈ F ℓ 2 of the user's index j is now encrypted twice, under the keys G (1) and G (2) . The resulting ciphertexts c (1) and c (2) have the form
where
and e (1) , e
$ ← − B(n, t). The zero-knowledge protocol of the scheme from Section IV-A is then developed to enable the prover, possessing witness (j, s, u (1) , u (2) , e (1) , e (2) ), to convince the verifier, with public input (
14
The protocol employs the same technical ideas of the one described in Section III. The facts that ciphertexts c (1) and c (2) encrypt the same plaintext I2B(j) is proved in zero-knowledge by executing two instances of the techniques for handling one ciphertext c in the protocol of Section III. The full description of the protocol can be found in Appendix B. Let Π be the NIZKAoK obtained by repeating the protocol κ = ω · log λ times and making it non-interactive via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. The group signature is set to be Σ = (c (1) , c (2) , Π), where
and Ch (1) , . . . ,
3) Verify(gpk, M, Σ): This algorithm proceeds as the verification algorithm of the scheme from Section IV-A, with c (1) , c (2) taking the place of c.
4)
Open(gmsk, M, Σ): Parse Σ as c (1) , c (2) , Π and run ME.Dec gmsk, c (1) to decrypt c (1) 
The efficiency, correctness, and security aspects of the above group signature scheme are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 8: The given group signature scheme is correct. The public key has size 2nk + (m + N )r bits while the signatures have bit-size bounded above by (N + 3 log N ) + m(log m + 1) + 2n(log n + 1) + 2k + 5λ κ + n. In the random oracle model we can make two further assertions. First, if the Decisional McEliece problem DMcE(n, k, t) and the Decisional Learning Parity with fixed-weight Noise problem DLPN(k −ℓ, n, B(n, t)) are hard, and if the underlying NIZKAoK system is simulationsound, then the scheme is CCA-anonymous. Second, if the Syndrome Decoding problem SD(m, r, ω) is hard, then the scheme is traceable.
Compared with the basic scheme in Section IV, the present scheme introduces one more McEliece encrypting matrix of size nk bits in the group public key, one more n-bit ciphertext and its supporting ZK sub-argument of well-formedness contained in Π in the group signature. Overall, the upgrade from CPA-anonymity to CCA-anonymity incurs only a small and reasonable overhead in terms of efficiency. Since the correctness and traceability analyses of the scheme are almost identical to those of the basis scheme in Section IV, the details are omitted here. In the next subsection, we will prove the CCA-anonymity property, which is the distinguished feature that we aim to accomplish.
B. CCA-Anonymity
Let A be any PPT adversary attacking the CCA-anonymity of the scheme with advantage ǫ. We will prove that ǫ = negl(λ) based on the ZK property and simulation-soundness of the underlying argument system. We keep the assumed hardness of the DMcE(n, k, t) and the DLPN(k − ℓ, n, B(n, t)) problems. Specifically, we consider the following sequence of hybrid experiments G 0 . This is the real CCA-anonymity experiment. The challenger runs KeyGen(1
and then gives gpk and {gsk[j]} j∈[0,N −1] to A. Queries to the opening oracle are answered using the opening secret key sk ME (1) . In the challenge phase, A outputs a message M * together with two indices j 0 , j 1 ∈ [0, N − 1]. The challenger sends back a challenge signature
The adversary outputs b with probability 1/2 + ǫ.
1 . The only difference between this experiment and G
0 is that, when running KeyGen(1 λ , 1 N ), the challenger retains the the second decryption key sk ME (2) instead of discarding it. The view of A in the two experiments are identical.
2 . This experiment is like Experiment G
1 with one modification in the signature opening oracle. Instead of using sk ME (1) to open signatures, the challenger uses sk ME (2) . It is easy to see that A's view will be the same as in Experiment G (b) 1 until an event F 2 when A queries the opening of a signature Σ = (c (1) , c (2) , Π) for which c (1) and c (2) encrypt distinct elements of F ℓ 2 . Since such an event F 2 could break the soundness of the zero-knowledge protocol used to generate Π, it could happen only with negligible probability. Therefore, the probability that A outputs b in this experiment is negligibly close to 1/2 + ǫ.
3 . This experiment is identical to Experiment G (b) 2 , except on one modification. Instead of faithfully computing the NIZKAoK Π * using witness (j, s, u (1) , u (2) , e (1) , e (2) ), the challenger simulates it by running the simulator of the underlying zero-knowledge protocol and programming the random oracle H. Note that Π * is a simulated argument for a true statement, since c
(1), * and c (2), * are honestly computed. Thanks to the statistical zero-knowledge property of the underlying protocol, Experiment G 2 in the proof of CPA-anonymity in Section IV-B. The only modification, with respect to the encrypting key G (1) , is that instead of generating it using ME.KeyGen(n, k, t), we sample it uniformly at random over F k×n 2
. By the assumed hardness of the DMcE(n, k, t) problem, this experiment is computationally indistinguishable from the previous experiment. (1), * as
2 , where v
The simulated NIZKAoK Π * now corresponds to a false statement, since c
(1), * is not a well-formed ciphertext. Nevertheless, in the challenge phase, assuming the hardness of the DLPN(k−ℓ, n, B(n, t)) problem, the adversary A can only observe the modification of c
(1), * with probability at most negligible in λ. The view of A is thus computationally close to that in Experiment G (b) 4 above until an event F 5 which could happen after the challenge phase when A queries the opening of a signature Σ = c (1) , c (2) , Π for which c (1) and c (2) encrypt distinct elements of F ℓ 2 . Since such an event F 5 could break the simulation-soundness of the underlying NIZKAoK, it could happen only with negligible probability. Therefore, the success probability of A in this experiment is negligibly close to that in Experiment G 7 . This experiment switches the encrypting key G (1) back to an honest key generated by ME.KeyGen(n, k, t), and store the corresponding decryption key sk ME (1) . By the assumed hardness of the DMcE(n, k, t) problem, this experiment is computationally indistinguishable from G
6 . Experiment G (b) 8 . In this experiment, we use sk ME (1) , instead of sk ME (2) , to answer signature opening queries. The view of A is identical to that in Experiment G
7 above until an event F 8 when A queries the opening of a signature Σ = c (1) , c (2) , Π for which c (1) and c (2) encrypt distinct elements of F ℓ 2 . Since such an event F 8 could break the simulation-soundness of the underlying NIZKAoK, it could happen only with negligible probability. . By the assumed hardness of the DMcE(n, k, t) problem, this experiment is computationally indistinguishable from Experiment G 
2 , where v 10 and G 11 are identical. As a result, the two experiments are statistically indistinguishable. Moreover, since G 11 no longer depends on the challenger's bit b, the advantage of A in this experiment is 0.
10 , G 11 are indistinguishable and that A has no advantage in game G 11 . It then follows that the advantage of A in attacking the CCA-anonymity of the scheme, i.e., in Experiment G (b) 0 , is negligible. This concludes the justification for the CCA-anonymity property.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS
This section presents basic implementation results of our proposed group signature schemes to demonstrate their feasibility.
A. Test Environment
The testing platform was a modern PC with a 3.4 GHz Intel Core i5 CPU and 32 GB of RAM. We employed the NTL [67] and gf2x [68] libraries for efficient polynomial operations over any field of characteristic 2. The Paterson algorithm [69] was used to decode binary Goppa codes in our implementation of the McEliece encryption. We employed SHA-3 with various output sizes to realize several hash functions.
To achieve 80-bit security, we chose the following parameters. The McEliece parameters were set to (n, k, t) = (2 11 , 1696, 32), as in [70] . The parameters for Syndrome Decoding were set to (m, r, ω) = (2756, 550, 121) so that the distribution of y 0 , . . . , y N −1 is 2 −80 -close to the uniform distribution over F r 2 , by Lemma 1, and that the SD(m, r, ω) problem is intractable with respect to the best known attacks. In particular, these parameters ensure the following work factor evaluations. First, the Information Set Decoding algorithm proposed in [43] has work factor more than 2 80 . For an evaluation formula, one can also refer to [71, Slide 3] . Second, the birthday attacks presented in [42] have work factors more than 2 80 . The number of protocol repetitions κ was set to 140 to obtain soundness 1 − 2 −80 . Table II shows the implementation results of our CPA-anonymous group signature scheme, together with its public key and signature sizes, with respect to various numbers of group users and different message sizes. To reduce the signature size, in the underlying zero-knowledge protocol, we sent a random seed instead of permutations when Ch = 2. Similarly, we sent a random seed instead of the whole response RSP when Ch = 3. Using this technique, the average signature sizes were reduced to about 159 KB for 4, 096 = 2 12 users and 876 KB for 65, 536 = 2 16 users, respectively. Our public key and signature sizes are linear in the number of group users N , but it does not come to the fore while N is less than 2 12 due to the respective sizes of G and H. Our implementation took 0.282 and 0.186 seconds for a 1 B message and 5.591 and 5.497 seconds for a 1 GB message, respectively, to sign a message and to verify a generated signature for a group of 65, 536 users. In our experiments, it takes about 5.30 seconds to hash a 1 GB message and it leads to the differences of signing and verifying times between a 1 B and a 1 GB messages. One may naturally expect that running times should be increased once N becomes larger. But, in Table II , the increases are negligible and on occasions the running time even decreases slightly as N grew up to 2
B. Experimental Results
12 . This could also be due to the effect that the time required to perform other basic operations with parameters G and H had on the overall running time. Table III contains the implementation results of our CCA-anonymous group signature scheme, along with public key and average signature sizes for various number of group users and different message sizes. The public key size of our CCAanonymous scheme is 434 KB larger than that of our CPA-anonymous version because it additionally requires the matrix G (2) . The average signature size is also about 46 KB larger since the response RSP additionally includes v
e when Ch = 1 and z (2) u , z (2) e when Ch = 2. We remark that there is no additional element to be sent for Ch = 3 since we just sent a random seed instead of the whole response, as in the implementation of our CPA-anonymous scheme. The results in Table III show that the CCA-anonymous version requires only a small overhead for key generation, signing, and verification. For example, the key generation algorithm took about 5 seconds more, which corresponds to the key generation time for the McEliece encryption. When the number of group users is less than 2 20 , it also took about 0.020 seconds and 0.015 seconds more to generate a signature and verify it, respectively. The overheads for signing are increased slightly once the number of group users is 2 24 , but they account for about 2.28% and 2.73% of total signing times for 1 B and 1 GB messages, respectively. In conclusion, to our best knowledge, the implementation results presented here are the first ones for post-quantum group signatures. We have thus demonstrated that our schemes, while not yet truly practical, are bringing post-quantum group signatures closer to practice.
VII. CONCLUSION
We put forward two provably secure code-based group signature schemes in the random oracle model. The first scheme satisfies the CPA-anonymity and traceability requirements for group signatures under the assumed hardness of three well-known problems in code-based cryptography. These are the McEliece problem, the Learning Parity with Noise problem and a variant of the Syndrome Decoding problem. We extend the basic scheme to achieve CCA-anonymity by exploiting the Naor-Yung transformation. The feasibility of the proposed schemes is backed by implementation results. We believe that our schemes constitute the only currently implementable candidate among known post-quantum group signatures.
The work we presented here inaugurates a foundational step in code-based group signatures. The natural continuation is to work towards either one of the following goals: achieving signature size which is sub-linear in the number group users and obtaining a secure scheme in the standard model.
APPENDIX A SUPPORTING PROOFS FOR THE UNDERLYING ZERO-KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT OF KNOWLEDGE
We provide supporting proofs that the interactive protocol given in Section III-A is a statistical zero-knowledge argument of knowledge.
A. Proof of the Zero-Knowledge Property
Proof of Lemma 3: Simulator S, given the public input (H, A, G, c) , begins by selecting a random Ch ∈ {1, 2, 3}. This is a prediction of the challenge value that V will not choose.
1) Case Ch = 1: S proceeds as follows.
. These steps can be done efficiently by using linear algebraic tools. b) Sample uniformly random objects, and send a commitment computed in the same manner as of the real prover. More explicitly, S samples
and sends the commitment CMT := (c
Upon receiving a challenge Ch from V, the simulator responds accordingly. a) If Ch = 1: Output ⊥ and abort.
. Then S sends the commitment CMT computed in the same manner as in (16) .
Upon receiving a challenge Ch from V, it responds as follows. a) If Ch = 1: (16) and c
Upon receiving a challenge Ch from V, it responds as follows. a) If Ch = 1: Send RSP computed as in the case (Ch = 2, Ch = 1). b) If Ch = 2: Send RSP computed as in the case (Ch = 1, Ch = 2). c) If Ch = 3: Output ⊥ and abort. In every case that we have considered above, the distribution of the commitment CMT and the distribution of the challenge Ch from V are statistically close to those in the real interaction, since the outputs of the random oracle COM are assumed to be uniformly random. Hence, the probability that S outputs ⊥ is negligibly close to 1/3. Moreover, one can check that whenever the simulator does not abort, it provides a successful transcript, whose distribution is statistically close to that of the prover in the real interaction. We have thus constructed a simulator that can successfully impersonate the honest prover, with probability 2/3.
B. Proof of the Argument of Knowledge Property
Proof of Lemma 4: Assume that we have a commitment CMT = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) and the three responses RSP 1 = b 1 , v s , w s , v x , v f , v e , w e ; ρ 2 , ρ 3 , RSP 2 = b 2 , π 2 , σ 2 , z s , z x , z u , z f , z e ; ρ 1 , ρ 3 , RSP 3 = b 3 , π 3 , σ 3 , y s , y x , y u , y f , y e ; ρ 1 , ρ 2 that satisfy all of the verification conditions when Ch = 1, Ch = 2, and Ch = 3, respectively. More explicitly, we have the relations w s ∈ B(m, ω), w x = δ N B2I(b1) , w f = Encode (B2I(b 1 )) , w e ∈ B(n, t), c 1 = COM b 2 , π 2 , σ 2 , H · z This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B THE ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROTOCOL UNDERLYING THE CCA-ANONYMOUS GROUP SIGNATURE SCHEME The required ZK protocol is a simple extension of the one underlying the CPA-anonymous group signature that we have described in Section III. Here, we handle two ciphertexts c (1) and c (2) of I2B(j) by executing two instances of the techniques used for handling one ciphertext c from Section III.
Applying the same transformations as in Section III, we can translate the statement to be proved to proving knowledge of s, x, {u (i) } i∈ [2] , f , {e (i) } i∈ [2] such that [2] , f = Encode(j), {e (i) ∈ B(n, t)} i∈ [2] .
A ZK argument for the obtained equivalent statement can then be obtained in Stern's framework, using the same permuting and masking techniques of Section III. The resulting interactive protocol is described in Fig. 2 , where COM is a collisionresistant hash function modelled as a random oracle. The protocol is a statistical ZKAoK. Its simulator and extractor are constructed in the same manner as for the protocol underlying the CPA-anonymous group signature, in the respective two sections of Appendix A. The details can therefore be safely omitted here. , c 2 , c 3 ) to V, where c 1 = COM b, π, {σ (i) } i∈ [2] , H · r
e } i∈ [2] ; ρ 1 ,
e )} i∈ [2] ; ρ 2 ,
e )} i∈ [2] ; ρ 3 .
2) Challenge: Upon receiving CMT, V sends a challenge Ch $ ← {1, 2, 3} to P. e )} i∈ [2] , {w (i) e = σ (i) (e (i) )} i∈ [2] .
e } i∈ [2] ; ρ 2 , ρ 3 to V. b) If Ch = 2: Reveal c 1 and c 3 . Let
e } i∈ [2] .
Send RSP := b 2 , π 2 , {σ
2 } i∈ [2] , z s , z x , {z (i) u } i∈ [2] , z f , {z
e } i∈ [2] ; ρ 1 , ρ 3 to V. u } i∈ [2] , y f = r f , {y e } i∈ [2] .
Send RSP := b 3 , π 3 , {σ
3 } i∈ [2] , y s , y x , {y (i) u } i∈ [2] , y f , {y (i) e } i∈ [2] ; ρ 1 , ρ 2 to V. e ∈ B(n, t)} i∈ [2] , and that
e } i∈ [2] ; ρ 2 and
e } i∈ [2] ; ρ 3 . b) If Ch = 2: Check that
e ⊕ c (i) } i∈ [2] ; ρ 1 ,
e )} i∈ [2] ; ρ 3 . e )} i∈ [2] ; ρ 2 .
In each case, V outputs 1 if and only if all the conditions hold. Otherwise, V outputs 0.
Fig. 2:
The underlying ZK protocol of the CCA-anonymous group signature.
